Russia’s Pravfond has granted €109,000 to a network of Telegram accounts to distribute propaganda about the Baltics.

In 2024, the creators of a pro-Kremlin Telegram network approached a Moscow-based foundation for Russian compatriots abroad with a proposal. In return for funding, they would “rescue political prisoners” in the Baltics, circulate nostalgic images from the Soviet Union era and offer “alternative” takes on development of Latvia’s economy as an EU country.

Documents obtained by the Danish public broadcaster and shared with Re:Baltica reveal that in 2024, the Pravfond granted €109,000 (11.5 million rubles) to Alexey Stefanov, a former Latvian – Russian journalist, to grow and coordinate a network of propaganda profiles on Telegram.

Re:Baltica has reviewed the complete grant application and a quarterly report on the project’s early progress in 2025. In its opening, the applicant argues that Telegram is now the only platform in the Baltics where “compatriots can access objective information,” claiming other Russian channels have been blocked. While pro-Russian bloggers still operate in the region, they “often publish content that does not fully align with the Russian message.” That, according to the documents, is why the applicant launched his own channels — and merged them into a “virtual network” of like-minded voices.

The project was officially submitted by a woman named Anna Stefanova, who is likely Stefanov’s wife. Her name matches that of a woman appearing in wedding photos with Stefanov on his Facebook profile. Their possible connection is further supported by the fact that Stefanov is mentioned as the project’s editor-in-chief in the grant application. His listed employer:  Rossiya Segodnya, the Russian state-sponsored propaganda conglomerate.

Why the project was submitted under his wife’s name remains unclear. Stefanov did not provide an explanation. In a phone conversation he denied any connection to the Telegram profiles and quickly ended the call.

“I don’t understand what you’re talking about. Sorry, I can’t speak right now,” he said.

Anna Stefanova did not respond to phone calls.

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Sipsikova slams Kallas

A web of disinformation on Telegram appears to centre around five profiles. Two operate in Russian — Балтийский мост (Baltic Bridge) and Тени Прибалтики (Shadows of the Baltics). A third, Прибалтика без цензуры (The Baltics Without Censorship), is also named, though Re:Baltica could not locate such a channel. 

Three more profiles operate in Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian — Laimes lācis, Vardan tos Lietuvos!, and Vana Toomase teataja. Each name draws on national cultural symbols. Laimes lācis comes from a short story written by Latvian author and means “Bear of Happiness”; the Lithuanian title uses a line from the national anthem; and Vana Toomas refers to a historic weather vane figure atop Tallinn’s Old Town Hall.

According to the project’s authors, the accounts are run by residents of the Baltic states.

Among the group, Балтийский мост is the flagship channel. It describes itself as the only Telegram account offering “objective information” on Russia’s treatment of Baltic culture and claims to “push back” against what it calls local propaganda.

“We also dispel myths about the Soviet occupation by publishing unique archival photos and videos,” the grant application states.

Disinformation researcher Solvita Denisa-Liepniece told Re:Baltica that the romanticisation of the Soviet Union is a core pillar of Kremlin propaganda. The aim is to sustain the illusion that “life was better in the past.”

This kind of content — sentimental memories captured in photos and video — spreads wildly on social media. “People are eager to share it, and in doing so, they unknowingly amplify the Kremlin’s message,” she says.

At present, Балтийский мост has just over 2,000 followers, but its creators aim to increase that number to 7,000 by year’s end. They claim the channel is already a success, pointing to data from Telegram analytics services TGstat and Telemeter. The stats suggest the channel’s content has been shared more than 1.3 million times across other Telegram profiles.

“That’s a classic tactic used by propaganda channels,” explains Anastasija Tetarenko-Supe, a researcher at the University of Latvia. “They cross-share content to amplify their reach and tap into broader audiences.”

The operation doesn’t end with Telegram.

Балтийский мост also runs weekly video programs on YouTube and Rutube. These 30-minute broadcasts are hosted under the pseudonym Sipsikova by Viktorija Fyodorova, a representative of the Kremlin-controlled outlet Sputnik. She delivers commentary on Baltic affairs “with irony, wit, and a pinch of spice” – applicants write.

Fyodorova previously lived in Estonia and speaks fluent Estonian. The show’s title — Sipsikova’s Networks — references Sipsik, a popular character from Estonian children’s literature.

In the videos, Fyodorova regularly mocks Kaja Kallas, the former Estonian Prime Minister and long-time Kremlin critic. Kallas, now a leading EU foreign policy figure, has been one of the most vocal supporters of Ukraine within the bloc — and a frequent target in Sipsikova’s segments.

When reached by phone, Fyodorova responded aggressively, refusing to give a clear answer on whether she still holds Estonian citizenship.

“Listen, maybe I should just give you my bank account number while I’m at it? What kind of disgusting questions are these?” she snapped and hung up.

According to the project’s own report, in April 2025, YouTube shut down the Балтийский мост channel — without explanation. The channel had also hosted episodes of Sipsikova’s Networks. The creators expressed disappointment, saying the profile had been rapidly gaining followers.

“To us, this only proves we’re on the right track — if the authorities in the Baltic states reacted so quickly to our work,” the propagandists concluded.

Re:Baltica has tracked a broader trend: YouTube has removed several pro-Kremlin channels in recent months. After a January investigation, the platform deleted the channel of Andrey Mamikin, a former Latvian MEP and journalist. It later removed another account created by the same Stefanov — Шпроты в изгнании (Sprats in Exile) — which featured interviews with Baltic residents who had migrated to “a better life” in Russia.

In its latest annual report, Estonia’s internal security service KAPO said the removals were tied to appearances by sanctioned individuals — people who, following the crackdown on official Russian propaganda outlets, turned to alternative platforms to spread their narratives.

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Fighting “russophobia”

A less prominent, but still active part of the disinformation network is Тени Прибалтики (Shadows of the Baltics), another Russian-language Telegram channel. Its aim is to combat what it describes as “russophobia in the Baltics” and to offer support to compatriots facing persecution.

“These are our people who have suffered from government abuse — punished for social media posts, for laying flowers at Soviet monuments, detained under political charges, arrested,” the project proposal claims.

In reality, many of those featured or supported by the channel are individuals promoting Kremlin narratives in Latvia. Some face criminal charges for inciting hatred, glorifying Russia’s war in Ukraine, or — in some cases — espionage.

Re:Baltica has reported that Pravfond pays for their lawyers. According to Re:Baltica’s calculations, since 2017 at least 15 pro-Kremlin activists in Latvia have requested money from Pravfond to cover legal fees, totalling around €164,000.

What is clear, however, is that roughly €56,000 was requested after Pravfond was added to the EU sanctions list in June 2023. It  means any such funding should be considered illegal.

Through an encrypted chat service, Тени Прибалтики also offers compatriots the chance to request legal assistance. According to the grant application, the project plans to bring on board a Russia-based lawyer in 2025 — someone familiar with both Russian and Baltic legislation.

The project’s first-quarter report claims that more than 20 people have already sought help through the channel. In every case, the requests are linked to relocating to Russia — questions about dual citizenship, applying for Russian passports, or managing paperwork in a new place of residence.

On a daily basis, the profile shares content from Russian state media and selected foreign outlets — reframed to align with the Kremlin’s narrative.

The project’s creators proudly note in their grant application that their content features “respected and authoritative” experts. Among them is Maria Butina, a current Russian MP who was previously convicted in the United States for espionage. Also listed are Alexander Frolov, deputy director of Russia’s National Energy Institute, and a Belarusian political analyst.

The roster also includes several well-known Kremlin-aligned voices from Latvia.

According to its administrators, Тени Прибалтики currently has 1,028 followers. Including reposts and citations, they claim the channel’s content has been shared nearly 400,000 times. By year’s end, they estimate that the channel will reach over 4,000 followers, with an ultimate goal of building an audience of 5,000 to 6,000.

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Creators of national accounts – unknown

Telegram channels operating in the national languages of the Baltic states appear to function differently from their Russian-language counterparts. According to the funding request, these accounts operate independently, with their own experts and contributors — yet still push pro-Kremlin content.

“In this way, the rights of Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians, who sympathize with Russia to receive an alternative viewpoint are ensured,” the grant application claims.

Re:Baltica found that the Latvian-language channel Laimes lācis most frequently republishes content from profiles associated with Stefanov. Alongside posts painting a bleak picture of life in the Baltics — complaints about the rising retirement age, increasing butter prices, and population decline — the channel also shares episodes of Sipsikova’s Networks.

Laimes lācis remains marginal, with only 163 followers. Re:Baltica received no reply to questions submitted through the channel’s chatbot.

The Lithuanian-language channel Vardan tos Lietuvos! also republishes content from Stefanov-linked profiles, but focuses more narrowly on historical imagery and videos — designed to evoke nostalgia for the Soviet era.

Meanwhile, the Estonian channel Vana Toomase teataja appears to operate outside Stefanov’s network. It does not repost content from the other channels, but its tone remains consistent — presenting the Baltics as a region in decline.

Re:Baltica partners from Delfi Estonia believe the profile may be run by Yelena Natalova, a French teacher who recently relocated to Russia. Re:Baltica previously reported about Natalova as one of the voices promoting the Kremlin narrative about the mass emigration of Russian compatriots from the Baltics to Russia.

According to Delfi, Natalova has identified herself in private correspondence as the administrator of Vana Toomase teataja and inquired about advertising on another Estonian Telegram profile. A screenshot shows a €50 bank transfer made from her Estonian account, referencing the Telegram channel by name.

Natalova did not respond to questions from Delfi.

Re:Baltica also contacted Telegram directly to ask whether it intends to take action, given that the listed profiles are receiving funding from a source under EU sanctions. No reply had been received at the time of publication.

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Pravfond – the spy fund

This investigation forms part of a large cross-border reporting project Dear Compatriots during which Re:Baltica obtained nearly 50,000 internal documents from Pravfond — including emails, grant applications, reports, and banking records — covering activity from 2007 to 2025.

Public data shows that Pravfond’s budget in 2023 stood at $3.5 million. Officially, the organisation claims to defend the “rights of compatriots abroad” in at least 40 countries across Europe and beyond.

In practice, Pravfond functions as a tool of Russia’s hybrid warfare, used by Moscow to advance its geopolitical interests — including funding covert propaganda outlets and paying legal costs for individuals accused of aiding Russian interests.

Scandinavian media have gone so far as to dub it “the spy fund.”

“This foundation has long been used to serve the goals of Russian intelligence,” Latvia’s State Security Service (VDD) chief Normunds Mežviets told Re:Baltica.  “People presenting themselves as independent experts, researchers, or Pravfond employees are, in fact, career officers of Russian intelligence services.”

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